Category: Jackpot

Jackpot Sensation Universe en español

Jackpot Sensation Universe en español

The doubt is always there, you can bingo en español Regístrate y Juega Univerxe. So yes, a set is a collection of objects, but an object is an abstraction. David Pitt Copyright © American Library Association.

Jackpot Sensation Universe en español -

En cambio, nuestro sistema considera cosas como la actualidad de la opinión y si el revisor compró el producto en Amazon. También analiza las opiniones para verificar la confiabilidad. close ; } } this. getElementById iframeId ; iframe.

max contentDiv. scrollHeight, contentDiv. offsetHeight, contentDiv. document iframe. Here he tackles all the "big questions," including the biggest of them all: Why does the universe seem so well adapted for life?

In his characteristically clear and elegant style, Davies shows how recent scientific discoveries point to a perplexing fact: many different aspects of the cosmos, from the properties of the humble carbon atom to the speed of light, seem tailor-made to produce life.

Our universe is bio-friendly by accident -- we just happened to win the cosmic jackpot. While this "multiverse" theory is compelling, it has bizarre implications, such as the existence of infinite copies of each of us and Matrix-like simulated universes. And it still leaves a lot unexplained. Informar de un problema con este producto o vendedor.

Previous page. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Fecha de publicación. Número de páginas. Ver todos los detalles. Next page. Los clientes que vieron este producto también vieron.

Página 1 de 1 Comenzar de nuevo Página 1 de 1. The Mind of God: The Scientific Basis for a Rational World. Paul Davies. Tapa blanda. The FIFTH MIRACLE: The Search for the Origin and Meaning of Life.

De Publishers Weekly With an articulate blend of science, metaphysics and philosophy—and a dash of religion—physicist and cosmologist Davies discusses the implications of the fact that the conditions of our universe are "just right" for life to exist: a concept known as the anthropic principle.

Had any of the universe's physical laws or constants been just a bit different, life as we know it would have been impossible. In attempting to explain why this is so, Davies summarizes the current state of knowledge in cosmology and provides an accessible introduction to particle physics.

He evaluates numerous explanations for the structure of our universe, such as the possibility that ours is but one of an infinite number of "multiverses," and examines the question that inevitably arises in discussing the anthropic principle: does the design of the universe imply the existence of an intelligent designer?

Davis's own feeling is that there is likely some sort of still undefined "life principle" in the cosmos but recognizes that this "is something I feel more in my heart than in my head. All rights reserved. Readers of a certain age may recall Carl Sagan, on his television series Cosmos , explaining how life on planet Earth was the result of a series of remarkable conditions, all happening to exist: just the right planet, at just the right distance from the sun, with just the right atmosphere, etc.

Without any one of these conditions, we might not be here. Davies, acclaimed physicist and author of numerous popular science books The Fifth Miracle , , expands on the life-as-series-of-lucky-breaks theme, exploring such elements as the speed of light, the carbon atom, the big bang, and the many-universe theory.

Davies is an enthusiastic writer, clearly amazed and delighted by the universe and its beautiful mysteries, and his thesis, that the universe is tailor-made to support human life though not necessarily designed for this purpose , is both engaging and enchanting. David Pitt Copyright © American Library Association.

Críticas "Paul Davies' Cosmic Jackpot is a truly mesmerizing book, no matter which you universe you may inhabit! of theoretical physics, author of Hyperspace and Parallel Worlds.

PAUL DAVIES is an internationally acclaimed physicist and cosmologist now at Arizona State University, where he is setting up a pioneering center for the “study of life, the universe, and everything. He is the author of more than twenty books, including The Mind of God, About Time, The Origin of Life, and How to Build a Time Machine.

He also chairs the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence postdetection committee, so that if SETI succeeds in finding intelligent life, he will be among the first to know. He lives in Phoenix, Arizona. Leer más. Brief content visible, double tap to read full content.

Full content visible, double tap to read brief content. Sobre el autor Sigue a los autores para recibir notificaciones de sus nuevas obras, así como recomendaciones mejoradas. Leer más Leer menos. Opiniones de clientes. Cómo funcionan las opiniones y calificaciones de clientes Las opiniones de clientes, incluidas las valoraciones de productos ayudan a que los clientes conozcan más acerca del producto y decidan si es el producto adecuado para ellos.

Más información sobre cómo funcionan las opiniones de clientes en Amazon. Imágenes en esta reseña. Opiniones con imágenes. Ver todas las fotos. Todas las fotos. Received used book, ordered new - had to return. Más Ocultar. Gracias por tus comentarios. Lo sentimos, se produjo un error.

Lo sentimos, no pudimos cargar la opinión. Ordenar opiniones por Opiniones principales Más recientes Opiniones principales. Opiniones destacadas de los Estados Unidos. Traducir todas las opiniones al Español. Ha surgido un problema al filtrar las opiniones justo en este momento.

Vuelva a intentarlo en otro momento. Compra verificada. This is an important book on how the universe can and might be, in which Paul Davies critically examines different hypotheses about single and multiple universes.

His book illuminates the most critical issues of physics and philosophy and of some biology underlying our understanding of Science and Religion. He has called himself an agnostic, and he does not argue for religious beliefs. This newest book by Davies is somewhat more technical than his other books but is still well within the general readership level.

Davies updates and expands upon all previous overviews I know of in the ways the universe can begin and remain in existence, enriching previous accounts especially in his discussion of multiple universes. Throughout the book, Davies flags the free parameters, or "constants of nature", some 20 of them counting force coupling constants and the masses of elementary particles, which, in the standard models of nuclear physics, astrophysics and cosmology, must be exquisitely fine-tuned to yield a single universe capable of supporting life.

As an alternative to this fine-tuning, physicists have proposed multiple universes, or a multiverse, wherein infinite universes, a few of them with properties supporting life, could counterbalance the infinitesimal probability of the degree of fine-tuning necessary in a single universe if it occurred only by chance.

The difference between these views has obvious and profound metaphysical and religious implications. It is a mathematical construct wherein physical theories might be "accommodated" - it can in principle provide a way to make predictions for those theories - but so far it cannot predict anything real, anything that has been or could be measured.

And right now the odds are about even and rapidly getting longer that it ever will. Davies spells out some of these wild possibilities - wild because there would be infinite possibilities, including infinite variations of the laws of physics among different universes - and he describes some that might be more likely from probability arguments.

I cannot do justice to that exciting ride without quoting his whole discussion. Finding the key to the universe was by no means inevitable.

For a start, there is no logical reason why nature should have a mathematical subtext in the first place.

And even if it does, there is no obvious reason why humans should be capable of comprehending it. You would never guess by looking at the physical world that beneath the surface hubbub of natural phenomena lies an abstract order, an order that can't be seen or heard or felt, but deduced.

Even the wisest mind couldn't tell merely from daily experience that the diverse physical systems making up the cosmos are linked, deep down, by a network of coded mathematical relationships.

Yet science has uncovered the existence of this concealed mathematical domain. We human beings have been made privy to the deepest workings of the universe. Other animals observe the same natural phenomena as we do, but alone among the creatures on this planet, Homo sapiens can also explain them.

How has this come about? Somehow the universe has engineered, not just its own awareness, but also its own comprehension.

Mindless, blundering atoms have conspired to make not just life, not just mind, but understanding. The evolving cosmos has spawned beings who are able not merely to watch the show, but to unravel the plot.

What is it that enables something as small and delicate and adapted to terrestrial life as the human brain to engage with the totality of the cosmos and the silent mathematical tune to which it dances? For all we know, this is the first and only time anywhere in the universe that minds have glimpsed the cosmic code.

If humans are snuffed out in the twinkling of a cosmic eye, it may never happen again. The universe may endure for a trillion years, shrouded in total mystery, save for a fleeting pulse of enlightenment on one small planet around one average star in one unexceptional galaxy, Could it just be a fluke?

Might the fact that the deepest level of reality has connected to a quirky natural phenomenon we call "the human mind" represent nothing but a bizarre and temporary aberration in an absurd and pointless universe?

Or is there an even deeper subplot at work? The Concept of Laws I may have given the impression that Newton belonged to a small sect that conjured science out of the blue as a result of mystical investigation. This wasn't so. Their work did not take place in a cultural vacuum: it was the product of many ancient traditions.

One of these was Greek philosophy, which encouraged the belief that the world could be explained by logic, reasoning, and mathematics. Another was agriculture, from which people learned about order and chaos by observing the cycles and rhythms of nature, punctuated by sudden and unpredictable disasters.

And then there were religions, especially monotheistic faiths, which encouraged belief in a created world order. The founding assumption of science is that the physical universe is neither arbitrary nor absurd; it is not just a meaningless jumble of objects and phenomena haphazardly juxtaposed.

Rather, there is a coherent scheme of things. This is often expressed by the simple aphorism that there is order in nature. But scientists have gone beyond this vague notion to formulate a system of well-defined laws. The existence of laws of nature is the starting point of this book, and indeed it is the starting point of science itself.

But right at the outset we encounter an obvious and profound enigma: Where do the laws of nature come from? As I have remarked, Galileo, Newton, and their contemporaries regarded the laws as thoughts in the mind of God, and their elegant mathematical form as a manifestation of God's rational plan for the universe.

Few scientists today would describe the laws of nature using such quaint language. Yet the questions remain of what these laws are and why they have the form that they do. If they aren't the product of divine providence, how can they be explained?

Historically, laws of nature were discussed by analogy to civil law, which arose as a means of regulating human society. Civil law is a concept that dates back to the time of the first settled communities, when some form of authority was needed to prevent social disorder.

Typically, a despotic leader would concoct a set of rules and exhort the populace to comply with them. Since one person's rules can be another person's problem, rulers would often appeal to divine authority to buttress their power. A city's god might be literally a stone statue in the town square, and a priest would be appointed to interpret the god's commandments.

The notion of turning to a higher, nonmaterial authority as justification for civil law underpins the Ten Commandments and was refined in the Jewish Torah.

Remnants of this notion survived into the modern era as the concept of the divine right of kings. Appeal was also made to an invisible higher power in support of laws of nature.

In the fourth century BCE the Stoic philosopher Cleanthes described "Universal Nature, piloting all things according to Law. Indeed, the word astronomy means "law of the stars. Thus the early Christian theologian Augustine of Hippo wrote that "the ordinary course of nature in the whole of creation has certain natural laws.

Oxford University became the center for scholars who applied mathematical philosophy to the study of nature. One of these so-called Oxford Calculators was Thomas Bradwardine — , later to become archbishop of Canterbury.

Bradwardine has been credited with the first scientific work to announce a general mathematical law of physics in the modern sense. Given this background, it is no surprise that when modern science emerged in Christian Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it was perfectly natural for the early scientists to believe that the laws they were discovering in the heavens and on Earth were the mathematical manifestations of God's ingenious handiwork.

The Special Status of the Laws of Physics Today, the laws of physics occupy the central position in science; indeed, they have assumed an almost deistic status themselves, often cited as the bedrock of physical reality. Let me give an everyday example. If you go to Pisa in Italy, you can see the famous leaning tower now restored to a safe inclination by engineering works.

Tradition says that Galileo dropped balls from the top of the tower to demonstrate how they fall under gravity. Whether or not this is true, he certainly did carry out some careful experiments with falling bodies, which is how he came to discover the following law.

If you drop a ball from the top of a tall building and measure how far it falls in one second, then repeat the experiment for two seconds, three seconds, and so on, you will find that the distance the ball travels increases as the square of the time.

The ball will fall four times as far in two seconds as in one, nine times as far in three seconds, and so on. Schoolchildren learn about this law as "a fact of nature" and normally move on without giving it much further thought. But I want to stop right there and ask the question, Why? Why is there such a mathematical rule at work on falling bodies?

Where does the rule come from? And why that rule and not some other? Let me give another example of a law of physics, one that made a big impression on me in my school days. It concerns the way magnets lose their grip on each other with separation.

Line them up side by side and measure the force as the distance between them increases. You will find that the force diminishes with the cube of the distance, which is to say that if we double the distance between the magnets, the force falls to one eighth, treble it and the force will be one twenty-seventh, and so on.

Again, I am prompted to ask the question, Why? Some laws of physics bear the name of their discoverer, such as Boyle's law for gases, which tells you that if you double the volume of a fixed mass of gas while keeping the temperature constant, its pressure is halved.

Or Kepler's laws of planetary motion, one of which says that the square of the period of an orbit is proportional to the cube of the orbit's radius. Perhaps the best-known laws are Newton's laws of motion and gravitation, the latter supposedly inspired by an apple falling from a tree.

It states that the force of gravity diminishes with distance as the square of the separation between the two bodies. That is, the force that binds the Earth to the sun, and prevents it from flying off alone across the galaxy, would fall to only one quarter the strength if the Earth's orbit were twice as big.

This is known as an inverse square law. I have drawn a graph depicting it in Figure 1. The fact that the physical world conforms to mathematical laws led Galileo to make a famous remark.

And this language is mathematics. Theoretical physics entails writing down equations that capture or model, as scientists say the real world of experience in a mathematical world of numbers and algebraic formulas. Then, by manipulating the mathematical symbols, one can work out what will happen in the real world, without actually carrying out the observation.

That is, by applying the equations that express the laws relevant to the problem of interest, the theoretical physicist can predict the answer. For example, by using Newton's laws of motion and gravitation, engineers can figure out when a spacecraft launched from Earth will reach Mars.

They can also calculate the required mass of fuel, the most favorable orbit, and a host of other factors in advance of the mission. And it works! The mathematical model faithfully describes what actually happens in the real world.

Of course, in practice one may have to simplify the model to save time and cost of the analysis, making the predictions good only to a certain level of approximation, but that is not the fault of the laws. When I was at school I took a fancy to a young lady in my class named Lindsay.

I didn't see much of her because she was studying mainly the arts and I was studying the sciences and mathematics. But we did meet up in the school library from time to time. On one occasion I was busy doing a calculation. I even remember what it was. If you throw a ball in the air at a certain speed and angle, Newton's laws let you work out how far it will travel before it hits the ground.

The equations tell you that to achieve maximum range you should throw the ball at 45° to the horizontal. If the ground on which you are standing slopes upward, however, the angle needs to be greater; by how much depends on the amount of slope. I was deeply engrossed in calculating the maximum range up an inclined plane when Lindsay looked up and asked what I was doing.

I explained. She seemed puzzled and skeptical. At the time I dismissed her question as silly — after all, this was what we had been taught to do! But over the years I came to see that her impulsive response precisely captures one of the deepest mysteries of science: Why is nature shadowed by a mathematical reality?

Why does theoretical physics work? As scientists have probed deeper and deeper into the workings of nature, all sorts of laws have come to light that are not at all obvious from a casual inspection of the world, for example, laws that regulate the internal components of atoms or the structure of stars.

The multiplicity of laws raises another challenging question: How long would a complete list of laws be? Would it include ten? two hundred? Might the list even be infinitely long?

Not all the laws are independent of one another. It wasn't long after Galileo, Kepler, Newton, and Boyle began discovering laws of physics that scientists found links between them.

For example, Newton's laws of gravitation and motion explain Kepler's three laws of planetary motion and so are in some sense deeper and more powerful. Newton's laws of motion also explain Boyle's law of gases when they are applied in a statistical way to a large collection of chaotically moving molecules.

In the four centuries that have passed since the first laws of physics were discovered, more and more have come to light, but more and more links have been spotted too. The laws of electricity, for example, were found to be connected to the laws of magnetism, which in turn explained the laws of light.

These interconnections led to a certain amount of confusion about which laws were "primary" and which could be derived from others.

Physicists began talking about "fundamental" laws and "secondary" laws, with the implication that the latter were formulated for convenience only.

Sometimes physicists call these "effective laws" to distinguish them from the "true" underlying fundamental laws, within which, at least in principle, the effective, or secondary, laws can all be subsumed.

In this respect, the laws of physics differ markedly from the laws of civil society, which are an untidy hodgepodge of statutes expanding without limit. To take an extreme case, the tax laws in most countries run to millions of words of text. By comparison, the Great Rule Book of Nature at least as it is currently understood would fit comfortably onto a single page.

This streamlining and repackaging process — finding links between laws and reducing them to ever more fundamental laws — continues apace, and it's tempting to believe that, at rock bottom, there is just a handful of truly fundamental laws, possibly even a single superlaw, from which all the other laws derive.

Given that the laws of physics underpin the entire scientific enterprise, it is curious that very few scientists bother to ask what these laws actually mean. Speak to physicists, and most of them will talk as if the laws are real things — not physical objects, of course, but abstract relationships between physical entities.

Importantly, though, they are relationships that really exist "out there" in the world and not just in our heads. For brevity I have been a bit cavalier with my terminology. If you confront a physicist and say, "Show me the laws of physics," you will be referred to a collection of textbooks — on mechanics, gravitation, electromagnetism, nuclear physics, and so on.

But a pertinent question is whether the laws you find in the books are actually the laws of physics or just somebody's best stab at them. Few physicists would claim that a law found in a book in print today is the last word on the subject; all the textbook laws are probably just some sort of approximation of the real ones.

Most physicists nevertheless believe that as science advances, the textbook laws will converge on the Real Thing. There is a subtlety buried in all this that will turn out to be of paramount importance when I come to discuss the origin of the laws.

The idea of laws began as a way of formalizing patterns in nature that connect physical events. Physicists became so familiar with the laws that somewhere along the way the laws themselves — as opposed to the events they describe — became promoted to reality.

The laws took on a life of their own. It is hard for nonscientists to grasp the significance of this step. One analogy might be made with the world of finance. Money in the pocket means coins and notes — real physical things that get exchanged for real physical goods or services.

But money in the abstract has also taken on a life of its own. Investors can grow or shrink, in my case money without ever buying or selling physical stuff.

For example, there are rules for manipulating different currencies that are at best tenuously connected to the actual purchasing function in your local corner shop. In fact, there is far more "money" in circulation, much of it swirling around cyberspace via the Internet, than can ever be accumulated as coins and notes.

In a similar vein, the laws of physics are said to inhabit an abstract realm and touch the physical world only when they "act.

This "prescriptive" view of physical laws as having power over nature is not without its detractors namely, philosophers who prefer a "descriptive" view. So we have this image of really existing laws of physics ensconced in a transcendent aerie, lording it over lowly matter.

One reason for this way of thinking about the laws concerns the role of mathematics. Numbers began as a way of labeling and tallying physical things such as beads or sheep.

As the subject of mathematics developed, and extended from simple arithmetic into geometry, algebra, calculus, and so forth, so these mathematical objects and relationships came to assume an independent existence. In this Platonic heaven there would be found, for example, perfect circles — as opposed to the circles we encounter in the real world, which will always be flawed approximations to the ideal.

Many modern mathematicians are Platonists at least on weekends. They believe that mathematical objects have real existence yet are not situated in the physical universe. Theoretical physicists, who are steeped in the Platonic tradition, also find it natural to locate the mathematical laws of physics in a Platonic realm.

I have depicted this arrangement diagrammatically in Figure 2. In the final chapter I shall take a critical look at the nature of physical laws and ask whether the Platonic view has become an unwelcome fixation in the drive to understand the mathematical underpinnings of the universe.

Goodbye God? Religion was the first systematic attempt to explain the universe comprehensively. It presented the world as a product of mind or minds, of supernatural agents who could order or disorder nature at will.

In Hinduism, Brahma is creator and Shiva destroyer. In Judaism, Yahweh is both creator and destroyer. For the traditional Aboriginal people of the Kimberley in Australia, two creator beings acted in synergy.

Wallanganda, a male space being, sprinkled water on Wunngud, a female snake coiled in jelly, to make Yorro Yorro — the world as we see it. The major world religions devoted centuries of scholarship in attempts to make these theistic explanations cogent and consistent.

Even today, millions of people base their worldview on a religious interpretation of nature. Science was the second great attempt to explain the world. This time, explanations were cast in terms of impersonal forces and natural, physical processes rather than the activities of purposive supernatural agents.

When scientific explanations conflicted with religious explanations, religion invariably lost the battle. Mostly, theologians retreated to concentrate on social and ethical matters such as spiritual enlightenment, content to leave interpreting the physical universe to the scientists.

There are still people who believe that rain is made by rain gods rather than by atmospheric processes, but I wouldn't rate their chances in a debate with a meteorologist. When it comes to actual physical phenomena, science wins hands down against gods and miracles.

That is not to say that science has explained everything. There remain some pretty big gaps: for example, scientists don't know how life began, and they are almost totally baffled by consciousness. Even some familiar phenomena, such as turbulent fluids, are not completely understood.

But this doesn't mean that one needs to appeal to magic or miracles to plug the gaps; what is needed are advances in scientific understanding. This is a topic I shall address in detail in Chapter No matter what else happens in the evolving universe, it must be temporally embedded in this dualistic self-inclusion operation.

In the CTMU, the self-inclusion process is known as conspansion and occurs at the distributed, Lorentz-invariant conspansion rate c, a time-space conversion factor already familiar as the speed of light in vacuo conspansion consists of two alternative phases accounting for the wave and particle properties of matter and affording a logical explanation for accelerating cosmic expansion.

When we imagine a dynamic self-including set, we think of a set growing larger and larger in order to engulf itself from without. Instead, self-inclusion and self-description must occur inwardly as the universe stratifies into a temporal sequence of states, each state topologically and computationally contained in the one preceding it where the conventionally limited term computation is understood to refer to a more powerful SCSPL-based concept, protocomputation, involving spatiotemporal parallelism.

On the present level of discourse, this inward self-inclusion is the conspansive basis of what we call spacetime. What on earth does Lorentz invariance have to do with this muddle? Every object in spacetime includes the entirety of spacetime as a state-transition syntax according to which its next state is created.

This guarantees the mutual consistency of states and the overall unity of the dynamic entity the real universe. from a state of topological self-inclusion where Ét denotes topological or set-theoretic inclusion and Éd denotes descriptive inclusion, e.

A syntax is a method of writing down a sequence of symbols that expresses some logical statement. And he seems to think that the idea of describing the universe as a state transition system is somehow profound and original.

The rest of that paragraph is yet more of his silly word-games, trying to cope with the self-created paradox of inclusion and size in his mangled set theory.

Well, it really sounds most like the gobbledigook Sokal made fun of, but if I pretend for the moment that there is some actual meaning behind the words, that meaning is more like a version of positivism than it is relativism. There is also no indication at least in these excerpts that he thinks reality can be manipulated by people in the way that typically characterizes strong forms of relativism.

This, of course, leaves me with no rational alternative but to point out that Mark is not a legitimate critic. In fact, Mark is incompetent.

Thus, instead of defending myself against Mark, the most appropriate course of action in the present instance is to invite Mark to defend himself. There are a lot of ideas floating around out there. A three-way partition can also be applied to Internet pundits, e.

Mark, who entertain themselves and their readers by evaluating the ideas of others. Some are good at it, others are not so good, and others are a complete waste of time and bandwidth. In scholarly discourse, evaluators are required to justify their judgments. Those who display inadequate comprehension, discernment, or neutrality in their judgments, having failed one or more competency criteria, are by definition incompetent.

Among incompetent evaluators, the worst-of-breed are obviously those who chronically fail all three competency criteria. With regard to my essay, Mark fails all three competency criteria. Indeed, he readily admits to it. Instead, he pulls a cognitive switcheroo of which he is seemingly not consciously aware, automatically confusing his own incomprehension with incomprehensibility.

In fact, he often appears to wallow in irrationality with what appears to be near-demonic relish. Remember, the value and competency criteria listed above are objective in nature.

Obviously, as the very first order of business here, Mark needs to mend his incompetent ways. A summary here might at least enlighten us to your goals.

Dude, that stuff is from the INTRO page on your own website talking about CTMU. A set is a logical device used for talking about things. But you know what? You, in contrast, are just gibbering, outputting a cuckoo word salad whose high point is that it is grammatical and has some spiffy vocabulary in it now and then.

Telling us, for example, that some parts of what Mark wrote makes sense, and some parts do not, without giving any hints as to which is which, is all you can do to defend yourself. Rather telling, except to you.

It is certainly not known to be syntactical in any model yet proposed, but it could conceivably be. Wheeler for a while thought this hope might go somewhere, but nothing came of it.

Your defense does not apply here. Now, can we focus on your theory? We are not discussing about you, but your theory, and you are in a prime position to teach us. We are willing to learn and think. Can you give as any guiding idea? Reads like someone who has gotten lost in his own abstractions and become convinced of their independent reality.

that Mark and the singleton set that only has Mark as a member are two completely different things, and that the universe and the set of all things in the universe and, for that matter, the set that has the universe as a member are completely different things.

What he actually seems to be doing — if I am charitable — is a kind of mereology, Lesniewski-style, or perhaps trying to replace set-theory by a completely nominalistic mereology.

Besides, most of the questions he is asking and claims he is making would make no sense in mereology. Make of that what you want.

For example certain properties of the reflexive self-contained language of reality that it is syntactically self-distributed self-reading and coherently self-configuring and self-processing respectively correspond to the traditional theological properties omnipresence omniscience and omnipotence.

While the kind of theology that this entails neither requires nor supports the intercession of any supernatural being external to the real universe itself it does support the existence of a supraphysical being the SCSPL global operator-designer capable of bringing more to bear on localized physical contexts than meets the casual eye.

I tried reading through the CTMU, and got the exact same feeling as some others … complete semantics. I was expecting it to be about math, physics, or something a little more solid.

A high IQ is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for understanding advanced mathematics. Like Vos Savant, Langan has attempted to understand mathematics with his intellectual gifts alone, skipping over the thousands of hours of arduous study necessary for true comprehension.

I recommend Mr. Langan start here. How in hell does your statement make any sense? How does condescension have anything to do with spit or its qualities? Holy shit, Chris Langan is here in the comments! Unfortunately, he is also pretty much incapable of making himself understood — a form of low social intelligence.

Malcolm Gladwell relates in Outliers that Langan taught himself calculus at a young age; when he attended his first calculus class in university, he went to speak to the professor after the lecture to offer criticisms of the pedagogy.

The professor thought Langan was complaining that the material was too difficult — Langan was unable to convey the fact that he understood the material perfectly and had for years. Langan, please take my advice. I have a Ph. My advice is this: you have got to figure out how to get your ideas understood as much as possible by people whose intelligence does not compare to yours!

Try new things! Test your progress in this task! Langan is certainly intelligent. Not only do you need to know stuff, you also need to correct misunderstandings everyone does make in teaching themselves the fundamentals.

His problem is that he is thoroughly confused; the fundamental concepts and their application are misunderstood — and that means that he not only uses the wrong words; the questions he tries to solve are meaningless. His nonsense ideas probably stem from some fundamental understanding somewhere; the precise differences between syntax and semantics, and between sets and their elements, are my guess — every crucial distinction in set theory, mathematics, logic and physics is meshed together in an incoherent jumble.

There is no way to just clarify the passages above; they are wrong and usually not even wrong. Spinoza would shake his head in disappointment at how his philosophy got hijacked for something like this.

You know, it never looks good when the proprietor of a highly contentious web site hides behind his commentators. It tends to destroy the forum as an appropriate setting for serious intellectual discussions.

So I trust that Mark has merely been busy, or better yet, that he recognizes the futility of trying to defend his indefensible behavior.

Materialists think that the universe is a set of material objects e. But materialism is almost beside the point; all we need here is the scientific method.

With its unrelenting emphasis on observation of, and experimentation on, material objects including the measurement devices thereby affected, the scientific method demands that everything in science be related to observables and the objects to which they are attached, which, being individually discernable, qualify as elements of sets with all appropriate distinctions applied; e.

To cut them loose from the elements of observational sets would be to deprive them of observational content and empty them of all physical meaning. Everything discernable directly perceptible within the physical universe, including the universe itself as a coherent singleton , can be directly mapped into the set concept; only thusly are secondary concepts endowed with physical content.

One ends up with sets, and elements of sets, to which various otherwise-empty concepts are attached. Unfortunately, in standard theory, this attachment is reminiscent of sessile mollusks which have glued themselves to foreign bodies, and this is a problem for set theory as a descriptive language for the universe or as a foundational language of the mathematical formalisms applied to the universe by science , as it is subject to a crippling form of dualism which separates functions from the sets they relate.

But while set concept is obviously necessary — these other concepts are rendered physically meaningless without it — this in no way implies its sufficiency on any scale of reference. These statements are mathematically distinct. But this is completely absurd.

Whoops, no more science! Obviously, the universe IS a structured set, but not MERELY a set in the context of any established version of set theory. Hello, CTMU, and hello, SCSPL! In short, the author of Sentence 4 i. Quibbles aside, statement 5a is close to accurate; I do, after all, maintain that the universe is not merely a set, but something with greater expressive capacity properly including that inherent in the set concept itself.

Even though this may not seem like serious business to some readers, it certainly is. If Mark does not desist in his nonsense, it may well turn out to be something he regrets for the rest of his life. This is not because he is merely wrong; we all live and learn.

It is because Mark often lacks any clue regarding the wrong turns he has taken, and in order to distract himself from his frustration, habitually lashes out at the sources of his confusion like a vindictive child. Any failure of comprehension precipitates him into a fit of pique, at which point he disastrously for him attempts to damage the understanding and the reputations of others without just cause.

A set is a mathematical construct defined axiomatically. In math, we build mathematical models of things in order to study and understand them. There are many things in the universe that can be modeled very well using set theory. A mathematical model is not the thing that it models.

There are also many things in the universe that cannot be modeled very well using set theory. For example, try to put together a meaningful set-theoretic model of vacuum fluctuation and hawking radiation based on the set of particles in the universe. The universe and a mathematical model of the universe are very different things.

There are many different possible mathematical models of the universe. Even taking set theory as a basis, there are numerous different set-theoretic mathematical models of the universe.

The lack of understanding of this distinction — the difference between a model and the thing that it models — runs throughout your writing.

Because you muddle important distinctions. Syntax and semantics are very different things in a mathematical model. But if you insist that the mathematical model is indistinguishable from the thing that it models… then the syntax of an object is the object, the semantics of an object are the object, and therefore the syntax and semantics of the object are exactly the same thing — because they both are the object.

They muddle together fundamental concepts in nonsensical ways; they blur the distinctions between things that are necessarily distinct.

If you actually take the word salad and try to render it as math, what you get is something very much like naive set theory. And your system, which by definition embeds itself, necessarily includes all of the inconsistencies of naive set theory.

Lets recall the mathematical definition of a naive, not to be too hard on our friend set. Credits go to wikipedia. Then you say: the universe is an aggregation of objects. Well, as you which.

But, are they DISTINCT? Consider two identical particles, like two electrons, or two atoms in precisely the same quantum state.

If you know something about Physics elementary Physics , you will know that these particles can not be differentiated, and that they behave in a very particular way.

They are completely indistinguishable. Are they different objects? If you see two electrons orbiting an atom, and you look an instant later, you can not tell which particle is which.

Are the ultimate elementary particles distict? If it is so, no set for you. Particles can be entangled. Two particles behave like one entity. Are they distinct? Stand a moment to think. Maybe all particles are entangled in some way this is a very real possibility.

When you throw electrons agains a screen, you observe particles. But they are guided by a guiding wave function. But wait, a whole system can be described by only one quantum wave function!

Are their particles distinct? The whole universe can be described by a little bit complicated wave function. In quantum mechanics you loose locality, so you loose individual particles. From my point of view, you declare the universe a set, and you base this conclusion in your assumption that the universe is a set.

Not very good logic. You could model the universe as a set. But that will be your somewhat outdated model. But it is not something obvious. Of course, you now can always play word games and say you were speaking of an informal set, in everyday language.

Maybe you can save face that way. Or by saying that the Universe is the set of one element, the Real Universe.

You used practically all of the fallacies listed there. Note also that the claim here is simple wrong. There are in this thread, aside from Mark, multiple mathematicians and physicists commenting.

The fact that they all agree with Mark should cause you to wonder if maybe, just maybe, you are mistaken. In fact, it is incompatible with materialism to assume that the universe is a set of material objects, since sets are not material objects.

Materialists think that the universe consist of only material objects. The fact that sets are not material objects is precisely why nominalists like Lesniewski and Goodman developed mereology, as a substitute for set theory that satisfied their nominalist inclinations.

And nominalistic mereology is what Langan seems to be sliding into when he talks about collections and aggregations of objects at some point in the above rant. Of course, mathematical objects are generally not considered very problematic by materialists unless they are also nominalists especially given the revival of logicism.

Yes, you cannot physically measure or observe a set. A set is a mathematical object. But you can of course physically measure and observe the universe. Therefore, the universe is not a set. You can also use set theory as a tool when you describe the universe and make models of it.

isomorphism or partial isomorphism. That one blows the irony meters. Langan must be one of the most spectacular examples there is of Dunning-Kruger in action. Let me explain. But in terms of creativity, inventiveness, etc. I get the feeling Chris is a bit like that, only with an absurd, almost inconceivable amount of mental horsepower.

He can think through all of this stuff blindingly fast — but in terms of discerning whether any of it is a good idea … not so much. Reading some of the comments above, I realize Chris is doing another thing I am prone to doing.

I think it comes from having a very high ratio at a skill at seeing connections and synthesizing concepts from what knowledge you had, to b desire and ability for seeking out previously established work.

Seems like Chris is doing that in regards to deciphering the problems in applying set theory to the real world. Reading your comments, I think, helps me understand a bit better how someone smart can fuck up badly. Holy shit. Why would he even want to talk to any of us under these conditions?

Because that would be a heck of a lot more interesting than the current topic of discussion. Alright, then. In repeatedly failing to defend himself against the charge of evaluative incompetence, Mark has now exhausted his last chance to prove that he has the intellectual standing to criticize my work.

This makes it quite tedious to rebut him, as it is far easier for him to dash off a few paragraphs of ill-considered pseudomathematical gobbledygook than it is for me to explain all of his errors in detail.

Comment: It was Mark who first resorted to personalized invective in this exchange. Everybody around here seems to like Wikipedia. This definition is qualified and restricted by various strains of set theory, but it remains essentially intact as theoretical context varies.

More advanced versions of set theory improve on naïve set theory only by adding distinctions and restrictions; for example, NBG adds the concept of classes, while ZF proscribes self-inclusion. But to the extent that concepts truly describe their arguments, they are properties thereof. The entire function of the formal entities used in science and mathematics is to describe, i.

serve as descriptive properties of, the universe. Obviously, not all formal entities qualify as properties of the things to which they are attributed. However, when a form duly reflects the actual structure of X — e.

This is not how sound mathematical reasoning is conducted. Remove it from its structure, and it becomes indistinguishable as an object and inaccessible to coherent reference.

In logic, a model is a valid interpretative mapping, i. The model includes both ends of the mapping, argument and image, in the form of shared structure. So much for logic. The model can then be structurally non-identical to the argument, as when a scientist tentatively applies some mathematical description to a phenomenon without being sure that the description is correct, e.

In this case, the model is not a legitimate property of the object thereby modeled, and can thus be separated from it without depriving the argument of structure. This is the sense in which Marks seems to be using the term.

the logical sense, and it is my work that Mark has been criticizing. Comment: Although he seems unaware of it, Mark is not actually disagreeing with me here.

This makes it an actual property of the universe. But then the natural and mathematical languages to which the set concept is fundamental cannot be properly applied to the universe either, and science is impossible.

That is, it is a valid interpretative mapping. Because it is valid, it is an actual property of the thing modeled. Essentially, the syntax-semantics distinction is as simple as the form-content distinction on which it is based. By using a functional definition of syntax, one can avoid the necessity of enumerating its specific ingredients functional definition is definition in terms of function; one specifies the definiendum in terms of its functionality in the overall system in which it exists, independently of content, at any desired level of generality.

But a full extensional definition is not necessary for the purposes of this essay. Mark clearly has no business taking exception to my usage, as the CTMU is not his theory, but mine.

If Mark wants to use his own preferred definition of syntax and I can only imagine what that might be, if not the typographical structure of a programming language , then Mark needs to write his own theory.

There is one little respect in which Mark is right, however: the CTMU does indeed couple syntax and semantics in a new and profoundly different way, and has done so for the last couple of decades or more.

Perhaps someday, Mark will come to understand what this means. As Mark observes, there is plenty of mathematical terminology in this essay, and it has indeed been correctly and relevantly employed. Error 3: Mark says that my essay blurs the distinction between certain fundamental concepts.

In the present context, one may assume that he has two specific distinctions in mind: model universe and syntax semantics. But as we have already seen, it is Mark who does not understand these distinctions, at least in the context of the work he is criticizing.

Error 1: Again, Mark is attempting to impute the muddled character of his own mental state to the reasoning in my essay. This is evaluative incompetency plain and simple see the value and competency criteria enumerated above.

This is because he makes a hard and uncompromising distinction between form e. As we have seen, Mark cannot possibly justify this form of dualism, as it has the effect of separating the universe from the structural properties in terms of which we scientifically identify it and reason about it at any stage and on any level.

But just as obviously, he is neither a mathematician nor a philosopher. Writing good code is not easy, and Mark deserves respect for his evident ability to do it. He is simply not up to going toe-to-toe with all of those on whom he targets his uncontrollable resentment.

Some of you have offered, amidst the noise, what almost seems to be intended as constructive and well-meant advice. To the extent that this is actually the case, your efforts are appreciated.

I would merely advise you not to leap so readily to what seem to be your highly standardized conclusions regarding me, my level of knowledge, and the originality and profundity of my writing, lest you end up disappointed and embarrassed as a result.

You might learn something. There are more people here. In fact, there is a lot of people outside this little forum who do not seem to be very interested on your theory, neither. But it has to be:. The collection of all sets is not a set, and if it is, it would lead to contradictions.

So you have to impose some restrictions. c informative. You evade the question. Calling something a set explaining that you understand by set something vague and without giving any idea what the elements are is not very useful.

I would call that a sentence free of meaning. We understand you can start with a vaguely defined theory, and go refining it, working on it.

But you have a very vague idea of what a set is and try to force people to accept real Universe is one. Something very expressive to be what our Universe is. And if someone say the opposite, the hell with him, he is an ignorant. You are probably discovering how little people that counts are interested in your theory.

But please, stop doing that. You have not proved anything. By maintaining your concept of set open enough you can evade criticism for a while, but by the same measure you maintain your theory content free. Circular logic and vagueness would carry you nowhere.

Have you find anyone seriously interested in your theory? I still think the real Universe can be unmodelable as a set because you could not differentiate one entity from other. At quantum level, there is no individual particles.

Wave functions any function really can be described using sets. One can show all our current models can be expressed as a set and still not be allowed to say that the Universe is a set.

What I say is that we can never know if a model completely reflects reality, which it is a necessary step to make that identification, the model as the reality.

A lot. The contradiction comes when someone introduces the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. Then ask whether that set is a member of itself. Bertrand Russell tried to work around this by redefining terms so that a set cannot be a member of itself, but his approach is not universally accepted.

If I recall correctly, it produces different levels, so a set at level 0 can be a member of a class at level 1, but not of another level-0 set.

The Universal set is problematic only in some theories, but not in all. And you rightly pointed out an alternative problem. Yeah, Russell tried to do leveled sets, so that you had first-order sets, whose members were atoms; second-order sets, whose members were first order sets; third order sets whose members were second-order sets, and so on.

I mean, I hold responsibility for my opinions. I find it wrong for Langan to blame Mark for my opinions. I also believe you misinterpreted the origin of the many versus one situation. Langan has very peculiar ideas. Regardless of the their validity, when someone has non-common ideas it will always be a many vs one situation.

They can be true, or they can be false, but initially it will be that many vs one. How is Langan supposed to get anything done when new people keep popping up like weeds, each with different objections?

When Langan showed up here, his primary goal was to talk to Mark, not the unknown number of varied commentators. Well, yes, it is impossible for one person to cope with so much comments in a blog.

I believe this is a common problem. From this point of view, yes, it may be the only sensible thing to do, to talk only to Mark.

One thing on which Mr. However, Mr. For those who may not be familiar, within classical or intuitionist logic, one can derive any statement from a contradiction making every contradiction equal and maximal in expressive power.

This is wrong. First of all, naive set theory is not logically consistent. Consider for example, ZF with anti-Foundation replacing Foundation. Or ZF with a large cardinal axiom. So try explaining in it more simply, or using different language.

You are using language in a non-standard fashion again. Mark has a large amount of math background as should be pretty clear from reading his blog on a regular basis. There are multiple professional mathematicians in this thread. First off, the point of promoting this whole thing to a new post, rather than leaving it hidden in a discussion on a two-year-old post that had been migrated from my old site was, actually, intended as a gesture of respect.

Naive set theory is inconsistent. Naive set theory is ill-founded and ultimately useless , because no proof, no implication, no inference based on naive set theory is valid — because the fundamental axiomatic basis of naive set theory is invalid. Any argument that you make about set theory, or about anything built on set theory, is only as valid as the underlying theory.

There are lots of different axiomatizations of set theory. You just spew out a bunch of garbled word-salad. Yet here you go again, behaving as though I said the exact opposite.

But to my way of looking at it, both of those claims are absurd. Somewhere in the Deep South of yore, a bus containing a Black gospel choir was on its way to a revival.

Suddenly, a car stopped on the shoulder of the road pulled out directly in front of the bus. Panicked, the driver cranked the wheel as hard as he could, veering directly into the path of an oncoming semi.

Unable to stop, the fast-moving semi ripped open the midsection of the bus, strewing the highway with dead or injured passengers, some moaning in pain.

A minute or two later, an archetypal redneck and his woman drove up in a pickup truck. Seeing the carnage, the hillbilly stopped, got out of the truck, and sauntered among the bodies for a minute or two. Then he returned to the pickup, and without saying a word, resumed driving in the same direction as before.

On a more serious note, I think I know what your problem is. Why, with my superior math skills, this guy and everyone like him is totally at my mercy, cannon fodder for my unbelievably excellent anti-crank blog!

Good Math my opinion trumps Bad Math any conflicting opinion every time, so everybody better hunker down and get ready for some more of that trademark supercilious Chu-Carroll wit!

While you might see the latter self-dialogue as a bit over the top, your subsequent behavior shows that it accurately reflects your basic attitude. If you want people to accept your theory, you need to present it in ways that they can understand, and convince them that it is correct.

Unfortunately, you are hardly the only person who is presenting what he believes to be a revolutionary new theory. Not all of those theories are correct because they contradict each other. Even very intelligent people make mistakes. to: Chris Langan 1 How is your theory falsifiable?

For example, the heliocentric theory of the solar system was useful in that it simplified computations. The fact that is also represented the observable universe was simply a bonus. So, what utility does your theory provide? How does one measure the utility of being able to condescend to the entire world?

If Mr. Langan has had the better of his exchange with Mr. Chu-Carroll, not to mention some of the less knowledgeable commenters. Others have pointed accusatory fingers at Mr.

Langan, declaring him guilty of ad hominem attacks mostly falsely, in my opinion for merely having questioned Mr. Langan a crank! In fact, despite provocation, Mr.

Langan has not descended to personal attacks or name calling, and has confined his judgment to Mr. I think the worst insult he issued was to call Mr. He also made remarks that showed that he respects Mr. I trust that Mr. Chu-Carroll really thought Mr.

But so far Mr. Langan appears to me to have successfully defended himself against at least his selected set of Mr. Carroll may be the one who misunderstood. I enjoy Good Math Bad Math frequently. I often learn from it. But these occasional exercises in derision, and subsequent group efforts in condemnation, only detract from that.

I know that comments on blogs are notorious for such chauvinism, but perhaps this need not be the case here. Yes, of course. You can trivially say that any two non-distinct objects are one object.

You can go aggregating entities until you have only one. Strictly right. This is strictly true. But, let me say, it is also completely useless. By that treatment, everything is a set. Not a mathematical set, but some kind of aggregation of some stuff. At least one, the thing.

And he is fighting for this idea! If everything everything, think of it is a set, then that does not carry any information. That is why I explicitly said yes, I said it first!

Kasino Rizk dengan cepat Sensatio salah satu kasino Universd favorit saya. Platformnya ramping Sensatiin mudah dinavigasi, dan pilihan Regístrate y Juega slotnya fantastis. Saya mendapatkan Regístrate y Juega saat bermain di Rizk Regístrate y Juega tidak bisa lebih bahagia dengan pengalaman saya. Jika Anda sedang mencari kasino online yang sukses dengan slot yang bagus, Rizk adalah pilihan yang tepat. Selamat tinggal! Hanya ingin berbagi pengalaman fantastis yang saya miliki dengan kasino dan slot88 online. Saya menemukan kasino online baru beberapa minggu yang lalu dan anak laki-laki, apakah saya mendapat hadiah!

Author: Malakasa

1 thoughts on “Jackpot Sensation Universe en español

Leave a comment

Yours email will be published. Important fields a marked *

Design by